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Transport Malta report on MV Falkaland grounding during transit
TIN news: Transport Malta has issued an investigation report regarding MV Falkland grounding
The Incident
Falkland had left the port of Visnes, Norway on 11 December 2014 at about 1830 (LT). The vessel had just completed loading approximately 3080 metric tonnes of limestone in bulk. Falkland’s destination was Sarpsborg, Norway.
Until the time of the accident, the voyage was uneventful and the crew experienced no problems with the vessel’s navigation through the fjords
On 12 December 2014, the master took over the navigational watch at 0800 for his normal 0800-1200 watch. The master was the duty OOW. One of the ABs reported that he was also on duty on the bridge.
The master recalled that at some point after 1100, he went to the chart room to look for a chart because he had realised that it was not in the file used for that particular voyage
Just before 1115, the master noticed that the vessel was heading into shallow waters and a reef, which was dead ahead. The master observed that the vessel was too close to the reef and that he would not be able to avoid the grounding, even if he had to do a bold alteration of the course
The AB claimed that he was completely unaware that the vessel was running into shallow waters and navigating in close proximity of the reef.
In order to try and minimise the damage, the master immediately stopped the main engine. He also recalled that at that moment he called the other crew members to prepare them for the impact.
The AB stated that suddenly he felt a very strong jolt. In shock and stunned, he immediately ran down to the accommodation area to inform all the crew members that the vessel had just ran aground. It was also recalled that the vessel took a heavy heel to port, which, however, only lasted for a short while
Soon after the grounding, the crew members were instructed to take soundings of all the double bottoms and other tanks and to determine whether there was any flooding in other areas of the ship. At the time, all soundings indicated that there was no water ingress. It was confirmed that the vessel was aground in Florø area, in position 61° 44’N 004° 57.35’E . No injuries and pollution were reported.
The Incident
Falkland had left the port of Visnes, Norway on 11 December 2014 at about 1830 (LT). The vessel had just completed loading approximately 3080 metric tonnes of limestone in bulk. Falkland’s destination was Sarpsborg, Norway.
Until the time of the accident, the voyage was uneventful and the crew experienced no problems with the vessel’s navigation through the fjords
On 12 December 2014, the master took over the navigational watch at 0800 for his normal 0800-1200 watch. The master was the duty OOW. One of the ABs reported that he was also on duty on the bridge.
The master recalled that at some point after 1100, he went to the chart room to look for a chart because he had realised that it was not in the file used for that particular voyage
Just before 1115, the master noticed that the vessel was heading into shallow waters and a reef, which was dead ahead. The master observed that the vessel was too close to the reef and that he would not be able to avoid the grounding, even if he had to do a bold alteration of the course
The AB claimed that he was completely unaware that the vessel was running into shallow waters and navigating in close proximity of the reef.
In order to try and minimise the damage, the master immediately stopped the main engine. He also recalled that at that moment he called the other crew members to prepare them for the impact.
The AB stated that suddenly he felt a very strong jolt. In shock and stunned, he immediately ran down to the accommodation area to inform all the crew members that the vessel had just ran aground. It was also recalled that the vessel took a heavy heel to port, which, however, only lasted for a short while
Soon after the grounding, the crew members were instructed to take soundings of all the double bottoms and other tanks and to determine whether there was any flooding in other areas of the ship. At the time, all soundings indicated that there was no water ingress. It was confirmed that the vessel was aground in Florø area, in position 61° 44’N 004° 57.35’E . No injuries and pollution were reported.
Conclusions
1.The preventive barriers (technical, human and organisational), which should have prevented the grounding from happening had not worked as intended;
2. Numerous ‘No go’ areas had not been marked on the chart because it had been deemed impractical to mark them all on the paper;
3. The actual voyage plan document (Form 19) did not suggest that the limitations with respect to ‘No go’ areas had been addressed;
4. The redundancy and error tolerance of the system had been compromised;
5. The master did not make full use of the available crew members in order to continuously monitor the vessel’s position at a critical time when the vessel was navigating in close proximity of hazards;
6. The appraisal of the situation and the risk of grounding was incomplete;
7. The master did not notice the vessel heading into shallow waters until the very last moments before the grounding;
8. The master’s situation evolving on the bridge of Falkland was a situation of simultaneous tasks and distraction; during the period leading to the grounding, he was preoccupied with finding the appropriate chart
1.The preventive barriers (technical, human and organisational), which should have prevented the grounding from happening had not worked as intended;
2. Numerous ‘No go’ areas had not been marked on the chart because it had been deemed impractical to mark them all on the paper;
3. The actual voyage plan document (Form 19) did not suggest that the limitations with respect to ‘No go’ areas had been addressed;
4. The redundancy and error tolerance of the system had been compromised;
5. The master did not make full use of the available crew members in order to continuously monitor the vessel’s position at a critical time when the vessel was navigating in close proximity of hazards;
6. The appraisal of the situation and the risk of grounding was incomplete;
7. The master did not notice the vessel heading into shallow waters until the very last moments before the grounding;
8. The master’s situation evolving on the bridge of Falkland was a situation of simultaneous tasks and distraction; during the period leading to the grounding, he was preoccupied with finding the appropriate chart