DB Makes Statement Following Investigation into 2022 Garmisch-Partenkirchen Accident
An independent internal investigation commissioned by Deutsche Bahn (DB) following an accident in Garmisch-Partenkirchen on June 3, 2022 has been concluded.

An independent internal investigation commissioned by Deutsche Bahn (DB) following an accident in Garmisch-Partenkirchen on June 3, 2022 has been concluded.
The accident, which left five dead and 72 injured, involved the derailing of a regional express train between the Garmisch-Partenkirchen and Farchant stations near Burgrain.
The cause of the accident was found to be defective concrete sleepers that, due to chemical reactions within the concrete core, no longer offered sufficient load-bearing capacity.
During the last three years, law firm Gleiss Lutz has carried out an investigation analysing the causes of the accident in order to establish an order of responsibilities across all levels, including the conducting of interviews with over sixty people, as well as the evaluation of around 10 million data points.
A confidential final report has been received by DB, with DB stating it will cooperate fully with all investigating authorities.
The report filed by Gleiss Lutz concluded that the train accident was preventable, and that it was the direct result of a breach of rules and duties by those working on site, whilst at the same time, the then DB Netz provided an insufficient response to findings that regarded damaged concrete sleepers that had been made available before the accident itself.
Philipp Nagl, CEO of DB InfraGO, said:
This result is shocking and saddens us. However, I can assure the bereaved families and those affected by the accident that we have already taken and will continue to take comprehensive action.
This includes measures against all those who acted in breach of duty, as well as precautions that we have introduced and will introduce at all levels to prevent future misconduct.
DB InfraGO has stated it will assert claims for compensation against former members of the Board of Management, who had also been indicted in the report filed by Gleiss Lutz.
Gleiss Lutz has also conducted a structured process in order to analyse what it refers to as the ‘underlying systemic causes that led to the accident’, including any organisational, procedural and cultural ‘deficiencies’.
In order to address this, DB has launched a project to systematically and sustainably address the stated ‘deficiencies’ through a number of measures, including:
- A comprehensive sleeper replacement program that will see DB preventively replacing all potentially hazardous sleepers, with a large portion has already having been removed
- Continuously considered the scientific and technical findings and incorporated them into its regulations in a more stringent guideline for assessing defects in concrete sleepers
- Conducting extensive training and awareness-raising measures to ensure the necessary risk sensitivity at all levels, with training measures continued and expanded in the future
- The Management Board of DB InfraGO has proactively and precautionarily commissioned an assessment to determine whether other infrastructure areas also face similar challenges to those with concrete sleepers. All immediate areas of action have been addressed
DB has also established a project for the future-oriented approach to addressing the aforementioned ‘deficiencies’, which is slated to be completed by the beginning of 2028 and includes:
- Organizational measures to strengthen the safety architecture (reporting lines, control concepts)
- Further development of processes, guidelines, and support systems, including knowledge management and information flow, with the goal of holistic risk management
- Cultural and awareness-raising measures to strengthen the safety culture
Gleiss Lutz has stated it will support the implementation of the aforementioned remediation measures as part of a voluntary monitoring programme to ensure the elimination of the identified ‘deficiencies’.